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INTRODUCTION 
For Hume, "virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous 
motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those motives" (Treatise, 
478). Hume distinguishes virtuous from vicious motives by the pleasure and 
pain each respectively produces upon its "mere view and contemplation." 
We call a charitable act virtuous, Hume contends, because when we 
contemplate charity as a motivation to act we naturally feel a certain 
pleasure. The origin of this pleasure is obvious in cases where we benefit 
directly from the contemplated charitable act. It is less so, however, in 
cases where we do not. Historical acts of charity in distant lands do not 
benefit present individuals. Yet, we praise such remote acts of charity. 
Hume argues that sympathy, or "fellow-feeling," communicates to us the 
pleasure such acts produce; because sympathy "connects" all humans, we 
"feel" the pleasures and pains of others. We approve or disapprove of 
actions accordingly.1 Because humans naturally perform some actions out of 
charity and because humans naturally approve of such actions, charity is, 
for Hume, a natural virtue. 
Hume begins Part II, Book III of the Treatise with a problem. Given 
the foregoing, whence arises the virtues associated with justice? Hume 
finds no one common naturally occurring motivation to act justly. Unable to 
explain the virtues associated with justice in terms of naturally occuring 
motivations to act, of which humans naturally approve, Hume concludes 
that "we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv'd 
from nature, but arises artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and 
human conventions" (Treatise, 483). 
Justice is, for Hume, an artificial virtue in two respects. First, human 
nature alone does not motivate humans to act justly; human nature, given 
certain conventions, motivates humans to act justly. Second, the 
contemplation of a just act in and of itself does not naturally produce 
pleasure; the contemplation of a just act given a certain conventional 
context produces pleasure. Only within a context of certain artificial 
1 Actually, "corrected sympathy" explains our approval of remote acts of 
justice. The more remote a just act, the fainter the impression of pleasure 
sympathy communicates to us when we contemplate that act. Yet, we 
approve of remote acts of justice just as heartily as proximate acts of justice. 
Hume argues that in these cases we "correct" or "modify" our judgment to 
take account of sympathy's inability to communicate lively impressions 
over great distance or time. 
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human conventions does human nature lead humans to act justly and to 
approve of just acts. 
This alone, of course, does not adequately explain the virtues 
associated with justice. Hume must explain the artificial human 
conventions that lead humans to act justly and approve of just acts. This 
paper will focus upon Hume's account of what motivates humans to develop 
the conventions of justice and his account of the content of those conventions. 
But first, a brief sketch of Hume's story regarding the conventions of justice 
is in order. 
JUSTICE AND CONVENTION: HUME'S STORY BRIEFLY TOLD 
Individuals do not fare as well outside society as within it. Society 
provides individuals with security, stability and material goods 
otherwise unavailable; family life teaches this. Thus, Hume argues, 
human nature, specifically, self-love, naturally produces in each 
individual the desire to live in society. 
Self-love, however, pulls also in an opposite direction. Individuals 
desire society, in part, because society increases the available supply of 
transferable goods, and everyone wants to increase their share of 
transferable goods. Because individuals desire an increase in their share of 
transferable goods, given relative scarcity, they will, when able, simply 
take from the socially produced supply of transferable goods that which 
they desire. Self-love, unconstrained, leads individuals to render social 
relations insecure, unstable and unproductive. The contrary movements of 
self-love, Hume argues, prevent individuals from realizing that which 
they most desire.2 
Of course, humans do achieve society. "(N)ature," Hume argues, 
"provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is 
incommodious in the affections" (Treatise, 489). When humans realize 
that conflict over the possession of transferable goods stands as the 
principal obstacle to social relations, they: 
"...seek...a remedy, by putting those goods, as far as 
possible, on the same footing with [non-transferable 
2 One might categorize various theories of justice according to that aspect of 
economic life most central to the theory. For example, while Humean, 
Marxist and liberal theories of justice all take account of the various 
moments in economic life, each identifies a different moment as central to 
its theory of justice. Hume builds his theory of justice as a solution to 
certain problems regarding the consumption of transferable goods. Marx 
builds his theory of justice as a solution to problems regarding the 
production of goods. And liberals build their theory of justice as a solution 
to problems regarding the distribution of goods. 
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goods]. This can be done after no other manner, than by a 
convention enter'd into by all the members of the society 
to bestow stability on the possession of those external 
goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of 
what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. By this 
means, every one knows what he may safely possess; and 
the passions are restrain'd in their partial and 
contradictory motions" (Treatise, 489). 
Simply put, judgment and understanding lead humans to see that they best 
realize their selfish desires through human conventions regarding 
property, right and obligation. And so, humans, acting out of enlightened 
self-interest, produce and maintain conventions regarding the possession 
and transfer of property and the performance of promises. Hume calls these 
conventions the "rules of justice." 
Hume does not suggest that these conventional rules of justice arise out 
of a social contract. On Hume's view, they could not, for the very 
obligations which constitute a contract arise out of the conventional rules of 
justice. The rules of justice arise rather as the result of self-interest 
operating in association with intelligent reflection upon experience over 
time. Hume suggests that the conventional rules of justice emerge in a 
manner analogous to that by which two individuals, each wanting to cross 
a river but unable to promise anything to the other, perhaps even unable to 
speak to the other, come to row together a single boat across the river. 
Every individual desires to improve her security, stability and material 
well-being. Over time, Hume argues, every individual learns that she 
satisfies her individual desires best if she individually conforms her 
conduct to conventional rules governing social relations, provided others do 
the same. Individuals produce and sustain the practice of justice out of self-
interest. 
Although individuals produce and initially practice justice solely out 
of self-interest, they come in time to practice justice also because it is 
morally right to do so. Hume argues that the moral approbation of justice, 
the status of justice as a virtue, arises not out of self-interest, but out of each 
individual's sympathy with the public interest. Individuals need not 
practice justice for long before they will realize that justice works to 
everyone's individual advantage; it furthers the public or general interest. 
Thus, the mere contemplation of a just act produces, through the operation 
of sympathy, a pleasure, which the understanding then corrects (to account 
for the failure of sympathy to communicate pleasure without a loss in 
vivacity across vast distances of time and space). 3 In this way, justice 
acquires the status of a (artificial) moral virtue. 
3 In his effort to explain the uniformity and universality of moral 
evaluation, Hume also argues that the nature of language and necessities of 
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Now, while the foregoing sketch does not represent completely Hume's 
views on justice, it does, I hope, represent those views with detail 
sufficient to support a more careful investigation into a few chapters in 
Hume's story. It is to that investigation I now turn. 
SELF-INTEREST AND JUSTICE 
Hume states "that 'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd 
generousity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his 
wants, that justice derives its origin" (Treatise, 495). Hume grounds justice 
in self-interest and the fact that, at best, our natural generosity extends 
about as far as the immediate family (and sometimes not even that far). 4 
In short, for Hume, the conventional rules of justice sprout from the soil of 
self-interest. Moreover, prudent self-interest alone, Hume argues, will 
sustain the practice of justice (at least in a society with very few resources). 
Now, Hume does not explicitly say what he means by self-interest or 
self-love. He appears to have in mind that force in human nature which 
drives individuals to satisfy their desires, or to place their interests ahead 
of the interests of others. Prima facie, Hume appears in the sections on the 
origin of justice in the Treatise to be an egoist, a hedonist, or both. But 
Hume acknowledges elsewhere that humans sometimes act for non-
hedonistic and non-egoistic reasons (See, e.g., Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, hereinafter EPM, Appendix II; Treatise, p. 439.) For 
example, humans eat food, at least in the first instance and sometimes quite 
often, not because eating food produces pleasure, but because human nature 
provides humans with a desire to eat food. And, humans seek revenge not 
out of a desire to secure a self-centered good, but to visit pain upon another. 
While humans naturally desire pleasure and the absence of pain, not all 
desires are hedonistic. And while humans naturally wish to satisfy their 
desires, not all desires are self-directed. 
But what, then, does Hume mean when he claims that the origin of 
justice is self-interest? He might mean that justice enables everyone to 
satisfy overall more of their egoistic or egoistic-hedonistic desires, 
regardless of the content of those desires. Or, perhaps Hume means that 
communication force individuals to take a more general point of view when 
they speak of matters moral. Thus language, sympathy and judgment 
together provide moral evaluations with their characteristic uniformity 
and universality. 
4 Also, resources must be relatively scarce for justice to arise. Hume argues 
that were nature to bestow an abundance of resources so that everyone had 
all that she desired, justice would serve no purpose and would not arise. 
Some have interpreted Marx to have held a similar view, that the 
abundance available within a communist state (and the elimination of 
class conflict) renders justice unnecessary. 
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justice enables everyone to satisfy best their instinctive desires for security, 
stability and material goods. Hume's meaning is just not clear. 
Hume often speaks of self-interest and (limited) benevolence as the 
two fundamental forces at work in human nature. And he often speaks as if 
only pleasure and pain activated these forces. But this leaves certain 
instinctive desires, for example, the desires for food, sex and revenge, 
unexplained in terms of human nature. Hume recognized this and allowed 
that some desires arise out of neither self-interest nor benevolence, but some 
other force in human nature. This is correct. But the possibility that 
human nature includes primitive motivational forces other than self-
interest and benevolence complicates Hume's account of justice in a way 
Hume does not adequately address. 
Hume argues that all humans desire security, stability and material 
goods. He does not say whether humans desire these for the pleasure they 
produce or out of instinct, as with the desire for food, sex or revenge. Hume 
does tie these desires to self-interest, but he does not say whether he means 
just that the satisfaction of these desires furthers self-interest (which 
might be true of the satisfaction of any desire, provided it is my desire) or 
whether the desires arise out of self-interest (which would be true for only 
egoistic desires). In any case, Hume suggests that humans seek and value 
social relations because only within social relations do humans satisfy 
their desires for security, stability, and material goods; humans desire 
society as a means to certain desired ends. Humans do not, Hume implies, 
desire social relations for their own sake. 
But Hume's discussion of self-interest and human motivation does not 
rule out the possibility that human nature might provide humans with a 
direct desire for social relations, a desire similar to the desire for food. 
Indeed, Hume comes close to suggesting just such a desire. Speaking of the 
usefulness of the social virtues, Hume states "that the end, which they 
have a tendency to promote, must be some way agreeable to us, and take 
hold of some natural affection" (EPM, p. 214). Hume then states, however, 
that this end, the preservation of society, must please either "from 
considerations of self-interest, or from more generous motives and regards" 
(Id., p. 215). Because benevolence cannot account for the scope of justice, 
Hume continues, justice must, by default, arise out of self-interest.5 
5 Hume, of course, acknowledges that humans will naturally act out of 
benevolence, but only with respect to immediate family and the like. 
Humans do not act out of benevolence toward strangers or the public in 
general. Thus, benevolence, Hume argues, could not give rise to justice, a 
virtue whose scope exceeds immediate family. 
Given that benevolence for Hume entails something like putting the 
interests of another before one's own interests, Hume is correct that 
benevolence generally does not reach much past immediate family and 
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Hume's argument here turns on the impossibility of justice arising out of 
some third force in human nature, some natural instinct like the desire to 
eat. Hume considers this possibility in the EPM but quickly dismisses it. 
He argues that if justice arises out of some instinctive primitive force at 
work in human nature, then property rights must arise out of the same 
instinctive primitive force, for property rights are the object of justice. But 
nothing, Hume suggests, could be more absurd than this (Id., p. 201). 
This argument fails to rule out the possibility that justice might arise 
out of a primitive force at work in human nature other than self-interest or 
benevolence. Hume considers and rejects only the possibility that justice 
arises directly out of a natural instinct or desire for justice. He does not 
consider that justice might arise indirectly out of a force in human nature 
other than self-interest, benevolence or a desire for justice itself. 
Specifically, Hume does not consider whether human nature provides 
individuals with a raw desire for social relations. Interestingly, Hume 
does argue that humanity's "first state and situation may justly be esteem'd 
social" (Treatise, p. 493). But he does not consider explaining that state as 
the result of a force in human nature both weaker, but with greater scope, 
than benevolence and distinguishable from self-interest, something like an 
instinct to recognize the interests of others as a part of one's own interests, 
an instinct for the collective. 
I am not arguing here that human nature includes such an instinct, 
although I would not be surprised if it did. I am arguing only that Hume's 
argument that justice arises out of self-interest is incomplete without his 
addressing this possibility. If human nature included such a raw desire for 
social relations, Hume, of course, could still argue that individuals could 
not satisfy this natural desire except through the operation of conventions. 
After all, human nature presumably provides each individual with a 
desire to communicate with others, to use language, yet this desire cannot 
be satisfied except through the operation of conventions. Justice might arise 
out of a natural force other than self-interest or benevolence and yet still 
remain artificial or conventional in the same way language is. Indeed, in 
several passages Hume speaks as if he has this in mind, despite his 
repeated and ambiguous references to self-interest.6 
loved ones; justice could not originate in benevolence. The issue I am raising 
is whether self-interest is the only alternative origin. 
6 Because Hume locates the origin of the practice of justice in "self-
interest," and the origin of the moral approbation of justice in "the public 
interest," he has been interpreted often as either a proto-rational-choice-
theorist (in the spirit of Gauthier) or as a proto-utilitarian. The 
ambiguity of Hume's presentation has encouraged these readings. 
Hume does not present a proto-utilitarian theory of justice. Hume 
offers a descriptive, naturalistic theory of justice, not a normative theory. 
But more importantly, Hume does not explain justice as the maximization 
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CONVENTIONS AND POWER 
Hume suggests that the conventions constituting the rules of justice 
might have emerged in a manner similar to that by which two individuals 
desiring to cross a river in a single boat come to row together. The analogy 
is a poor one. Hume assumes that the two individuals share a similar aim, 
getting across the river. Moreover, he assumes that the two individuals 
agree to ride in a single boat. And further, he assumes that neither desires 
a free-ride, each is willing to row even if the other is rowing already. All 
that the two individuals in Hume's rowing example must do is coordinate 
their rowing. That humans routinely solve such coordination problems 
through convention cannot be doubted. But the problems Hume identifies as 
the principal obstacles to society are not mere coordination problems. They 
are conflict problems. 
Hume's rowing example would be more effective, given the point he 
wishes to make with it, were he to begin with two individuals, who each 
prefer to take the one available boat across the river alone, rather than 
together, but who also each prefer to cross the river rather than not cross 
the river. Such a scenario reflects more accurately the conflicts that arise 
inevitably over the possession and use of transferable goods as social 
relations emerge. On these facts, and given each individual's desire to 
travel alone, it is less than obvious that the reciprocal give and take Hume 
imagines characteristic of convention-building would produce an optimal 
(or any) convention, i.e., one through which both individuals cross the 
river. The stronger of the two individuals will likely cross the river alone. 
Hume needs additional facts to make his point about the origin of 
conventions. Suppose that person A was not capable of excluding person B 
from the boat without great expense and risk, and conversely, that person B 
was not capable of excluding person A from the boat without similar 
expense and risk. Given this fact, persons A and B will in time undoubtedly 
seek to avoid their endless confrontation. Assuming, however, that they 
understand that they share the same aim in part, namely to cross the river, 
the conventional property right the two will likely settle on will be joint 
of social utility, understood (setting aside the content of preferences) as an 
aggregate measure of either the strength of individual preferences or the 
pleasure derived from the satisfaction of individual preferences. Hume 
comes closer, however, to explaining justice as a conventional social 
arrangement bargained for by individual rational utility maximizers. But 
Hume is no proto-Gauthier. Hume argues that the morality of justice, the 
moral force attendant to the obligations of justice, arises from both self-
interest and sympathy with the public interest. Gauthier rests both the 
practice and morality of justice on self-interest alone. 
70 AUSLEGUNG 
ownership; they will share the boat. Of course, once they settle on sharing 
the boat, they will, as Hume notes, quickly learn to row together. 
Two points should be made here. First, to explain why two 
individuals with conflicting desires over the use of resources will settle 
their conflict through conventional property rights rather than force, one 
must assume both that each individual possesses power sufficient to 
frustrate the desires of the other and that each individual prefers peace 
and a partial satisfaction of her preferences to conflict. Hume explicitly 
states that individuals prefer peace to conflict (the truth of which is not 
self-evident). Hume is less explicit with respect to the equality of power 
between individuals. He undoubtedly assumes that with respect to 
transferable goods individuals, in fact, possess power sufficient to frustrate 
the desires of others, because everyone must sleep sometime and 
transferable goods are by definition easily transfered. But this is probably 
insufficient. Absent a more substantial equality of power between 
individuals, one Hume does not argue for, it seems likely that some 
individuals through natural or acquired abilities will find themselves 
practically invulnerable to the will of others. Hume provides such 
individuals with no reason to participate in convention-building.7 
Moreover, because Hume's argument for convention-building rests upon 
an equal distribution of power among the individual parties to the 
convention, Hume provides no reason for those with power to include those 
without power in the convention-building process or treat them as parties 
to the conventions eventually produced. Hume states: 
"Were there a species of creatures intermingled with 
men, which, though rational, were possessed of such 
inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were 
incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the 
highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their 
resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is that we 
should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle 
usage to these creatures, but should not, properly 
speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to 
them, nor could they possess any right or property, 
exclusive of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with 
them could not be called society, which supposes a degree 
7 Hume cannot invoke the threat of legal sanction as a reason for such 
powerful individuals to participate in convention-building, for he has not 
yet argued for executive government. Arguably, where power is unequally 
distributed among individuals such that some individuals do not need to 
participate in convention-building to satisfy their preferences, some form of 
executive government is a necessary condition for the emergence of 
conventional rules of justice in the first place. 
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of equality; but absolute command on the one side, and 
servile obedience on the other" (EPM, p. 190-191). 
The realm of justice simply does not extend, for Hume, to women, the 
handicapped, children and others unable to pose a threat sufficient to 
include them in the convention-building process.8 To be sure, Hume does not 
argue that such individuals be mistreated. But he does force them to 
articulate their claims upon us in the language of pity rather than justice. 
Second, the conventional property right most likely to be produced 
under conditions of relative scarcity and equality of power would be the 
right to communal possession and use. Hume, however, argues exactly the 
opposite. He argues that under such circumstances the conventional 
property right individuals will produce would be the right to ownership of 
present possessions. Hume does not adequately explain why individuals 
with equal power will allocate relatively scarce resources in a manner that 
provides for individual ownership of present possessions. If boats with 
which to cross a river are relatively scarce and individuals each possess 
power sufficient to frustrate their exclusion from such resources, any 
convention grounded in self-interest will involve the mutual possession and 
enjoyment of the resources in question. But Hume thinks otherwise. 
Hume commits an error here. He distinguishes between a convention 
establishing the stability of possession and a convention allocating 
possessions (Treatise, 502-503). The former Hume grounds in self-interest. 
The latter he grounds in custom. Hume, then, does not exactly claim that 
self-interest leads individuals to the conventional property right to 
ownership of present possessions. Rather, he claims that self-interest 
leads individuals to a convention regarding the stability of possession. The 
force of custom on the imagination then leads individuals to the ownership 
of present possessions, that being the most natural distribution, given the 
already-existing convention establishing stability of possession. 
But there is no difference between these two conventions. Any 
convention that establishes the stability of possession also allocates 
possessions. If self-interest controls the former, it must also control the 
latter. Of course, if self-interest controls the latter, Hume cannot, as I have 
argued above, explain through convention the ownership of present 
possessions. Individuals with equal power will produce, with respect to 
relatively scarce resources, conventional property rights of a communal 
variety. To show, with respect to relatively scarce resources, that self-
interest leads individuals to the conventional property right of individual 
8 In Book III, Part II, Section XII of the Treatise, Hume argues for the 
conventional nature of the "female virtues" of chastity and modesty. His 
argument, however, consistent with the foregoing remarks, supposes that 
men alone produce the convention that determines these virtues for women. 
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ownership of present possessions, Hume must create a distinction where 
none exists.9 
One final objection to Hume's discussion of the conventional rules of 
justice. Because Hume sees the rowing of a boat and the use of language as 
the paradigmatic cases of convention, he assimilates his analysis of the 
conventional rules of justice to these cases. But the two types of cases could 
not be more dissimilar. 
With respect to rowing a boat, using a language or driving upon the 
roads, each individual participating in the activity benefits from 
following the socially prescribed convention, provided others do the same. 
Moreover, with respect to these activities, the content of the socially 
prescribed convention will not significantly benefit any one individual or 
group. Whether the convention a society produces regarding driving 
prescribes driving upon the left or right side of the road is not important; 
what is important is that the society produce a convention and stick with 
it. In such cases, the utility or usefulness of the convention to both 
individuals and the public at large follows from the existence of the 
convention, not its content. 
Hume analyzes justice in just this way. The usefulness or utility 
associated with the rules of justice in any society stems not from the specific 
content of those rules, but from their existence alone. To be sure, Hume 
argues for particular rules regarding the transfer of property and the 
performance of promises, but the rules for which he argues are general. 
With respect to property rights, the particular rules for which Hume 
argues are even vaguer. In the end, Hume maintains, the play of the 
imagination rather than considerations of reason or justice will primarily 
9 Hume, perhaps, exacerbates this error by applying his analysis not only 
to the possession of transferable goods but to the possession of land as well. 
Hume begins the convention-building process with conflicts over 
transferable goods only. He ends the convention-building process with the 
absolute property right to individual ownership of both personal and real 
property presently possessed. At first glance, this suggests philosophical 
sleight of hand. 
Perhaps Hume thought that absolute, individual property rights in 
land did not need explaining. He may have thought that because land was 
abundant, any individual excluded from a parcel could always acquire her 
own parcel down the path. Thus, Hume might argue, conflicts over real 
property would not cause individuals to undertake the convention-building 
process. However, once individuals had established conventional property 
rights regarding personal property, the imagination would naturally lead 
them to extend those rights to real property as well. This, at least, would 
limit the weakness of Hume's accout to the origin of absolute property 
rights in presently possessed transferable property. 
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determine the particular content of the rules of justice in any society and 
their particular application in any case. 
Nonetheless, Hume does argue that the particular rules of justice in 
any society will further the public good. He states: 
"If we examine the particular laws, by which justice is 
directed, and property determined; we shall still be 
presented with the same conclusion. The good of mankind 
is the only object of all these laws and regulations. Not 
only it is (sic) requisite, for the peace and interest of 
society, that men's possessions should be separated; but 
the rules, which we follow, in making the separation, are 
such as can best be contrived to serve farther the interests 
of society'*™ (EPM, p. 192). 
Hume fails here to think carefully about justice. From the fact that 
everyone does better with a system of conventional property rights than 
without it does not follow that every particular system of conventional 
property rights is best for everyone, even best for most. The conventions 
governing property are not like the conventions governing driving. 
Particular conventional arrangements regarding property rights often 
significantly benefit particular individuals or groups without benefiting 
others. Hume offers no argument that those less advantaged by particular 
conventional arrangements would be worse off under all other conventional 
arrangements. He argues only that they would be worse off without any 
conventional arrangement. Hume must argue, if he can, that the particular 
conventional arrangements regarding property rights he has in mind not 
only benefit everyone, but benefit everyone more than any other particular 
conventional arrangement.11 
CONCLUSION 
Hume argues effectively against the rationalist tradition in ethics and 
the natural law/natural rights tradition in jurisprudence. Hume argues less 
effectively, however, for the conventional nature of justice. Hume fails to 
ground justice in self-interest, in part because he fails to state explicitly 
what he means by self-interest, and in part because he fails to consider 
1 0 Of course, Hume means by "society" only those men with sufficient vigor 
to pose a threat to others, for they are the convention-builders. 
1 1 This requires that Hume unpack the notion of "public good" or "interest of 
society." It is not clear whether by such phrases Hume means an aggregate 
calculation of utility, an intuitive estimation of social well-being, or some 
other notion. Moreover, it is not clear whether he means to include women, 
children and others not technically within the scope of "society." 
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plausible alternative foundations for justice. Further, Hume fails to 
explain traditional property rights as the result of (everyone's) self-
interest operating indirectly through convention. In the end, while Hume 
eliminates the possibility that justice can be explained through God or 
reason, he does not eliminate the possibility that it can be explained 
through the power of a few, rather than the self-interest of all, operating 
indirectly through convention. 
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